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Abstract
This paper uses the conventional wisdom about the shift in the monetary policy
stance in 1979 to compute monetary policy shocks by estimating di¤erent monetary
policy reaction functions for the pre-1979 and post-1979 time periods. We use the
information from the internal forecasts of the Federal Reserve to derive monetary policy
shocks. The results in this paper show that a monetary policy shock in the pre-1979
period a¤ects output and prices much more strongly and quickly than what has been
reported in the literature for the full sample. Our ndings suggest that the dynamic
response of output and prices to a monetary policy shock declined signicantly between
1980-2001. We argue that this diminished response to the monetary policy shock is
the result of a successful monetary policy that has led to a less volatile economy.
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy is not exogenously given, but largely driven by policy makers reactions
to macroeconomic conditions (Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997)). In order to measure
the impact of monetary policy, we therefore need to estimate its component that does not
respond endogenously to the changes in the macroeconomic environment. To overcome the
problem of endogeneity, di¤erent approaches have been proposed. One notable approach is
the identication of monetary policy shocks due to Romer and Romer (2004)1. Romer and
Romer (2004; RR hereafter) derive their measure of monetary policy shocks by regressing
changes in the intended federal funds rate on information about output growth, ination and
the unemployment rate for every regular Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting
in the period between 1969 and 1996.2 The residuals from this regression show the change in
the intended federal funds rate not taken in response to information about future economic
developments. They therefore constitute a measure of monetary policy shocks.
The results of RRs analysis are appealing from a theoretical point of view: the "price
puzzle"3 disappears, and output also responds appropriately to monetary policy shocks.
However, RRs work is based on two simplifying assumptions: rst, they assume that the
monetary policy makersresponse to movements in ination and output has not changed for
the whole sample, and secondly, that the response of prices and output to monetary policy
shocks remained the same for the whole sample. This contradicts recent literature which
nds evidence of a change in the monetary policy reaction function within the examined
period4 and a change in the response of output and prices to monetary policy shocks5.
1Other popular approaches include the recursive VAR approach of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1996), the structural VAR approach of Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006), and
the Federal Funds Futures market approach of Kuttner (2001).
2The information about output growth, ination and the unemployment rate is represented by the Green-
book forecasts that are prepared by the Federal Reserve sta¤, and presented to the policymakers before each
FOMC meeting.
3Price puzzle refers to the positive response of prices to a monetary policy shock.
4Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2004).
5See the NBER working paper version (no. 5145, June 1995) of Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Barth and
Ramey (2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2002, 2006), Gertler and Lown (2000), Kishor and Kochin (2006), and
Kuttner and Mosser (2002). Boivin and Giannoni (2002, 2006) arrive at the same conclusions as our paper
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Our approach in this paper is based on the compelling evidence that the monetary policy
response to changes in macroeconomic conditions has changed since Paul Volcker took over
the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve in 1979 and that the Federal Reserve has played
a signicant role in the stabilization of the macroeconomy between 1980-2001. We also
recognize that the macroeconomic stability experienced in the U.S. between 1980-2001 might
have changed the response of output and prices to monetary policy shocks. Our approach of
sub-sample analysis allows us to examine the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables
to monetary policy shocks across the two sub-samples.
Using RRs approach, we derive monetary policy shocks by estimating di¤erent monetary
policy reaction functions for the pre-1979 and post-1979 periods. Our ndings suggest that
ignoring the instability in the monetary policy reaction function can provide a misleading
e¤ect of the monetary policy shock on output and prices for the whole sample. We nd that
the estimate of monetary policy shocks for the whole sample is disproportionately a¤ected
by the pre-1979 period shocks, and hence the response of output and prices to a monetary
policy shock for the whole sample in RRs analysis mainly reects the impact of the shocks
estimated from the rst sub-sample. If monetary policy shocks are estimated using di¤erent
sub-samples, we nd that the response of prices to a monetary policy shock is signicant and
in the right direction in both sub-samples. However, the e¤ect on prices is much weaker in the
second sub-sample. The response of output to monetary policy shocks is stronger and quicker
in the rst sub-sample than what has been reported by RR for the whole sample period.
In the second sub-sample, however, the e¤ect of a monetary shock on output disappears
completely.
Consequently, our results indicate that the dynamic response of output and prices to
monetary policy shocks computed from the internal forecasts of the Federal Reserve has
declined substantially since 1980. This result is consistent with what other researchers
including Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and Boivin and Giannoni (2002, 2006) have found
using di¤erent methodologies for the estimation of monetary policy shocks.
using a di¤erent approach.
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We argue that the smaller impact of monetary policy shocks on output and prices do
not in any way reect the reduction in the potency of monetary policy. In fact, the decline
in the responsiveness may itself be the result of a very successful monetary policy. If the
systematic component of monetary policy is perfectly successful, then the goal variables in-
cluding output and prices would become a constant. In that case we would therefore observe
a zero correlation between monetary policy shocks and output and prices. To illustrate this
point, we present a very simple New Keynesian model where we show that the reduction
in the response of output and prices to monetary policy shocks may arise from stabilizing
monetary policy6.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the approach
by Romer and Romer (2004) to estimate monetary policy shocks; section 3 presents the
estimation and analysis of monetary policy shocks for di¤erent sub-periods; section 4 presents
a simple model to motivate the main results of the paper, and section 5 concludes.
2 Estimation of Monetary Policy Shocks
We follow RRs approach for the estimation of monetary policy shocks. RR derived the
change in the intended federal funds rate for every regular FOMC meeting by using narrative
evidence from the FOMC meetings, the FOMC transcripts and the Greenbook. The changes
in the intended federal funds rate from meeting to meeting are regressed on the Greenbook
forecasts of ination, output growth and the unemployment rate:
M ffm = + ffbm +
2X
i= 1
i M eymi + 2X
i= 1
i(M eymi  M eym 1;i)
+
2X
i= 1
'iemi + 2X
i= 1
i(emi   em 1;i) + eum0 + "m: (1)
6Using a structural VAR model, Bovin and Giannoni (2006) show that the diminished response of output
and prices to monetary policy shocks can be explained by an increase of the Fed responsiveness to ination
expectations. Senda (2005) has also shown that the reduction in the volatility of output and ination has
been caused by a more aggressive response of the Federal Reserve to macroeconomic uctuations.
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In (1) M ffm represents the change in the intended federal funds rate, ffbm is the level of
the intended federal funds rate before the meeting, M eymi and emi are the forecasts of output
growth and ination, which are included for the previous and current quarter as well as for
two quarters ahead. M eymi  M eym 1;i and emi em 1;i are the revisions in the forecasts for a
certain quarter from the last to the current meeting, and um0 is the current quarter estimate
of the unemployment rate. The residuals "m represent the monetary policy shocks arising
from every meeting.
The e¤ect of a monetary policy shock on prices and output is analyzed by estimating a
VAR that has three variables; the log of industrial production, the log of the PPI for nished
goods and the measure of the monetary policy shock derived from the above method7. Since
the federal funds rate enters the VAR in levels the shocks are converted into monthly shocks
and cumulated. In what follows, we use the above approach by RR to analyze the results
with an extended data set (1969-2001).
As a rst step, we make sure that the extension of the data set does not alter the main
results obtained by RR. When we compare the shocks computed with our sample to the
ones by RR for 1969-1996, we nd a correlation of 0.990 for the cumulated shocks. They
are plotted in gure 1. The monthly shock series can be found in table 1. Figure 3 presents
the impulse-response functions for the estimated VAR system. They show the impact of the
cumulated shock on output and the price level for the period between 1969 and 2001. Not
surprisingly, the results for the larger data set are qualitatively similar to what RR report in
their paper. After a slight increase during the rst seven months, output shows a negative
response with a t-statistic of over 2 after the rst year. The peak response of output is 2.1
percent in month 23. It returns to its initial level after about three years. Prices respond
only slightly, irregularly, and mostly insignicantly in the rst seven months. Afterwards, we
observe a negative response throughout which becomes signicant after month 27 and nd
an e¤ect of -4.4 percent after 48 months. Thus, considering the sample period 1969-2001 as
a whole, the responses of output and prices to monetary shocks are compatible with what
7The description of the data used in this paper is given in the Data Appendix.
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monetary theory would predict.
But what drives this almost text-book like result for the whole period? The cumulated
monetary policy shocks plotted in gure 1 give an answer to this question. They reveal
the problem associated with RRs estimation of monetary policy shocks by using a single
monetary policy reaction function spanning the whole time period. Shocks are either persis-
tently negative or positive with an obvious turning point around 1979, which is consistent
with the compelling anecdotal evidence on the changes in the monetary policy around that
time. Keeping in mind that the monetary policy shocks are the residuals from a monetary
policy reaction function, the interpretation of this graph is straight forward. Since monetary
policy shock is the di¤erence between the intended federal funds rate and the tted value
of the intended federal funds rate, we get consistently negative values of the residuals for
the pre-1979 period. By construction, the use of whole sample leads to a lower value of the
tted federal funds rate in the second sub-sample, and hence the residuals are consistently
positive. The use of the full sample to estimate the monetary policy shocks would give the
impression of a more aggressive response to ination and real activity movements than it
originally was during the rst sample.
Thus the results of the VAR using the original approach by Romer and Romer (2004)
have one main drawback: They do not take into account the change in the macroeconomic
environment that took place around 1979. The next two sections consider this problem.
3 Changes in the Conduct and Impact of Monetary
Policy
Recent literature supports the view that there has been a structural shift in the way
monetary policy has responded to the movements in ination and output since Paul Volcker
took over the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) esti-
mate a forward-looking policy rule for the periods before and during the Volcker-Greenspan
era in order to evaluate monetary policys e¤ectiveness. Their results suggest that in the
period before 1979 monetary policy was too accommodative, whereas after 1979, beginning
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with Paul Volckers regime, monetary policy played a stabilizing role in containing ina-
tion. Orphanides (2000, 2001 and 2004) criticizes Clarida, Gali, and Gertlers results on
the ground that monetary policy makers are constrained by the availability of the real-time
data. He argues that the use of revised data in their paper provides misleading estimates
of the monetary policy reaction functions coe¢ cients. Orphanidesresults indicate that it
was the aggressive response to movements in the output gap that might have created the
inationary environment in the pre-1979 era, as the response to ination was not statistically
di¤erent across di¤erent sub-periods. Though the conclusions of the papers are certainly dif-
ferent, both approaches reveal that the policy-makersresponse to changes in macroeconomic
variables has changed over time.
The evidence presented in the previous section supports the conventional wisdom that
there was a fundamental shift in the way the Fed responded to ination and the output gap
since Paul Volcker became the chairman of the Federal Reserve. In addition, we perform a
Chow test for a structural break in coe¢ cients of equation (1) in the third quarter of 1979.
The test rejects the null hypothesis of no structural break in the third quarter of 1979 with
a p-value of 0.000. Therefore we estimate separate reaction functions for the pre-Volcker
and the Volcker-Greenspan periods for the derivation of the monetary policy shocks. Apart
from breaking the sample into two sub-periods and using a larger data set, we use the same
methodology as Romer and Romer (equation 1). Since performing the estimation for two
time periods (1969-1979 and 1979-2001) makes the sub-samples substantially shorter, we use
24 lags instead of 36 lags in the VAR system. We therein adopt a middle ground in the lag
length selection: Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) choose 12 lags in their study of
monetary policy shocks, whereas RR choose 36 lags in their estimation.
Following the methodology described in section 2, we initially estimate monetary policy
shocks for both sub-periods. The monthly shock series thus obtained is given in table 2. We
plot the cumulated monthly shock series in gure 3 and do not nd an obvious period of
persistently positive or negative shocks. Supported by the graphical evidence we nd that
there is a low correlation between the cumulated shocks for RRs and our approach for the
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whole sample (0.130). The correlation di¤ers remarkably for the pre-1979 (correlation of
0.514) and the post-1979 (correlation of only 0.042) periods.
To analyze the impact of a monetary policy shock on output and prices, a VAR system
is estimated that includes the log of industrial production, the log of the PPI for nished
goods and the new cumulated monetary shocks derived from two di¤erent monetary policy
reaction functions for pre-1979 and post-1979 sub-periods.
The results suggest that the e¤ect of a monetary policy shock is signicantly di¤erent
across the two time periods: For the pre-1979 sub-sample, we nd an immediate and negative
response of output to a one unit monetary policy shock which becomes signicant beginning
in month 6 (gure 4). The peak e¤ect of a 5.2 percent decline in month 14 is much stronger
and quicker than the response for the whole sample period and for one policy reaction
function. Interestingly, the e¤ect on output dies out at the beginning of the second year and
becomes positive and insignicant in month 28. The response of prices is negative beginning
with the second month and becomes signicant within a year. The price e¤ect peaks in
month 32 with a response of -6.5 percent and begins to die out afterwards.
The results for the second sub-period are entirely di¤erent. If we look at the second sub-
sample beginning in July 1979 (gure 5), we nd that the response of output to the monetary
contraction is throughout tiny, irregular, and insignicant. For ination the negative e¤ect
is small, but becomes signicant in month 7 and stays signicant until month 14. There is
also a slightly signicant e¤ect at the end of the fourth year. Note that the peak e¤ect of
less than  1:5 % in month 12 is much smaller as compared to the pre-1979 sub-sample.89
It has been argued that the period of non-borrowed reserves targeting (1979-1982), also
known as the "Volcker Experiment" was a period of excessive volatility, and it might have
played a big role in the estimation of monetary policy shocks. This problem has been
8The rst part of the e¤ect on prices is consistent with current literature on price changing behavior such
as by Taylor (1999), Nakamura and Steinsson (2006) and Bils and Klenow (2004).
9We also performed a similar analysis by estimating monetary shocks with a single reaction function but
dividing the sample into pre-1979 and the post-1979 periods. We nd qualitatively similar results for the rst
sub-sample. However, we do not nd any signicant response of output and prices to monetary policy shock
in the second sub-period. In fact, for some time periods output and prices move in the opposite direction to
what the theory would predict. The results are available upon request.
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emphasized by Bernanke and Mihov (1998), who state that the federal funds rate should not
be used as a monetary policy indicator for the time period between 1979 and 1982. Although
the Chow test of a structural break in coe¢ cients of equation (1) at the end of 1982 clearly
fails in rejecting the null hypothesis of no structural break (p-value of 0.38), we want to
make sure that the dynamic responses reported above are not driven by the huge variation
in the monetary shocks from this short sample. We therefore perform the above analysis
for the post-1982 sub-period. We nd that the e¤ect of a monetary policy shock on prices
to be tiny and insignicant throughout. The response of output is signicantly positive for
the rst eight months and insignicant afterwards.10 Thus eliminating the three years of
non-borrowed reserves targeting makes the change in the response of output and prices to
the unsystematic part of monetary policy even more obvious: Not only does the e¤ect on
prices decrease it vanishes completely. Not only does the e¤ect on output disappear the
response partially even reverses its sign.
Consequently, our results indicate that if the monetary policy shocks are estimated using
di¤erent reaction functions for the pre-1979 and the post-1979 time periods, then the response
of output and prices changes signicantly across these two sub-periods. Monetary policy
shocks inuenced prices almost "textbook-like" throughout the whole period from 1969 to
2001, though the response of the prices was smaller in the second period than in the rst.
In contrast, monetary policy shocks had a signicant e¤ect on output only in the rst sub-
sample. Overall our results show that the dynamic response of output and prices to monetary
policy shocks has declined signicantly in the second sub-period.
4 Has Monetary Policy Lost its E¤ectiveness?
The empirical evidence presented in the previous sections suggests that the response of
output and prices to monetary policy shocks has decreased considerably since 1980. Does this
imply that the Federal Reserve has partly lost its e¤ectiveness in controlling the economy?
10We also estimate the dynamic response of output and prices to monetary policy shocks estimated
from a single monetary policy reaction function for pre-1982 and post-1982 time periods. The results are
qualititatively similar, they are available upon request.
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Our results certainly do not imply that. In fact, the reduction in the response to monetary
policy shocks may result from the success of systematic monetary policy in dampening eco-
nomic uctuations. To illustrate this point, consider an extreme example. If monetary policy
is perfectly successful, then it would make the goal variable (output or price) a constant11.
By construction, a constant is uncorrelated with any variable, and thus it will be uncorre-
lated with monetary policy shocks. Therefore if systematic monetary policy was perfectly
successful in stabilizing the economy, we would not nd any correlation between monetary
policy shocks and ination and output.
To stress this point, we consider a simple New Keynesian model with a dynamic IS-curve
(2) and the New Keynesian Phillips curve (3)12:
yt = Etyt+1   rt + gt;  > 0 (2)
t = Ett+1 + yt + ut; (3)
where yt is output, t is the rate of ination, and rt is the real interest rate. All variables are
in terms of percent deviations from their long-run values. Output is negatively correlated
with the real interest rate and also depends on expected future output, as consumers want
to smooth their consumption over time. The parameter  is associated with the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption. Ination depends positively on future expecta-
tions about ination (discounted with the time preference factor ) and is positively linked
to the IS-curve through the output gap. The positive parameter  summarizes a plethora
of parameters from the New Keynesian model.13 The zero-mean disturbance terms gt and
ut can be interpreted as demand and cost-push shocks, respectively. Iterating equation (1)
forward, we obtain
yt =  rLt + gt (4)
where
rLt = Et
" 1X
j=0
rt+j
#
11Kishor and Kochin (2007).
12Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999).
13For details and the derivation of the two equations see Gali (2008).
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represents the long-run real interest rate which is determined by the expected path of the
short-term interest rates. Equation (4) implies that output is determined by the long-run
interest rate. Similarly, we can iterate (2) forward and nd that ination is determined by
a weighted sum of expected deviations of output from its natural level:
t = Et
" 1X
k=0
kyt+s
#
+ ut: (5)
In our example, the central bank conducts monetary policy by setting short-term interest
rates. Monetary policy actions can alter the path of expected short-term interest rates, and
hence inuence the long-term interest rate. It has been suggested by Taylor (1993) that
monetary policy follows an interest rate rule of the following type:
rt = yyt + t + "t: (6)
y and  represent the magnitudes of the response of the central bank to deviations of output
from its natural level and to ination. "t is the monetary policy shock which is assumed to
be uncorrelated with the demand shock gt and the cost-push shock ut. Combining equations
(4), (5) and (6), we obtain
yt =
gt   ut   "t
1 + y + 
(7)
t =
gt + (1 + y)ut   "t
1 + y + 
: (8)
The above expressions imply that equilibrium output and ination depend on demand,
cost-push and monetary policy shocks, as well as on the parameters , , y and . An
unexpected unit increase in the short-term interest rate ("t = 1) reduces equilibrium output
by =(1 + y + ), and decreases ination by =(1 + y + ). A reduction in the
impact of monetary policy shocks can arise through di¤erent channels: a reduction in  or
 or a higher value of y or . If monetary policy has become less potent, then, the lower
output response is due to a smaller elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
or due to an increase in the slope of the Phillips curve. If the lower output response is due
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to higher values of y or , then it is not related to the degree of potency of monetary
policy. In this case, the lower response of output to monetary policy shocks simply reects
the greater willingness on the part of the monetary policymakers to neutralize uctuations
in output and ination. In the extreme case, the central bank could, for instance, perfectly
stabilize output and ination by letting  become very large.
There is a compelling evidence in support of the stabilizing role of monetary policy
in the U.S. since 1980. The monetary policy literature suggests that the Federal Reserve
has responded aggressively to expected movements in output and ination to stabilize the
economy since 198014. Therefore the evidence of a decrease in the response of output and
prices to monetary policy shocks is likely not due to less potency of monetary policy, but a
result of successful monetary policy and its e¤ectiveness in stabilizing ination and output.
This explanation of lower responses of output and ination to monetary policy shocks is
consistent with the results obtained by other researchers in the monetary policy literature15.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we revisit the estimation of monetary policy shocks using the methodology of
Romer and Romer (2004) for the sample that runs from 1969 through 2001. We utilize the
conventional wisdom about a fundamental shift in the monetary policy formulation in the
U.S. after the appointment of Paul Volcker as the chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979 to
divide the sample into pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan sub-periods. Romer and Romer
(2004) assumed similar responses of the Federal Reserve to movements in ination and the
output gap for the whole sample period, 1969-1996, for the estimation of their monetary
policy shocks.
Our results indicate that the monetary policy shocks from the pre-Volcker sub-sample
disproportionately a¤ect the result for the whole sample when a single monetary policy re-
14Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2002, 2006), Favero and Rovelli (2003), Senda
(2005).
15For example, Barth and Ramey (2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2002, 2006), Gertler and Lown (2000),
Kishor and Kochin (2006), and Kuttner and Mosser (2002).
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action function is used to estimate them. If monetary policy shocks are estimated using
di¤erent reaction functions for the two di¤erent sub-samples, the results are strikingly di¤er-
ent. We nd that prices and output respond almost in a textbook fashion for the pre-Volcker
period. The response of output to a monetary policy shock is faster in the rst sub-sample
than what has been reported by Romer and Romer for the whole sample period. In contrast
to Romers and Romers ndings, our results show that outputs response to a monetary
policy shock in the second period is very small and insignicant, whereas the response of
prices is signicant and in the right direction. However, the magnitude of the price response
is much smaller as compared to the rst sub-sample and vanishes completely when the three
years of non-borrowed reserves targeting are excluded from the sample. The decline in the
magnitude of the response of prices and output to monetary policy shocks is consistent with
the results of Boivin and Giannoni (2005), and Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
We stress that the decline in the response of output and ination does not mean that
monetary policy has become less e¤ective after 1979. On the contrary, it can be shown that
the lack of response to the unsystematic part of monetary policy might be due to the success
of the systematic part of monetary policy in stabilizing output and ination.
Thus the results in this paper present an interesting conundrum about the impact of
monetary policy shocks. The exogenous shocks to monetary policy are estimated to sepa-
rate it from the endogenous response of monetary policy to changes in the macroeconomic
environment. The role of the systematic monetary policy or the endogenous movements in
the federal funds rate is to stabilize the economy. If the monetary policy is perfectly success-
ful in its objective, then the important question of what happens after an exogenous shock
to monetary policy becomes hard to answer, as the correlation between a perfectly stable
variable and the monetary policy shock would be zero. On the other hand, if the monetary
policy is not successful, then there remains enough variation on the goal variable to capture
the dynamic e¤ect of an exogenous shock to monetary policy.
13
References
[1] Barth, Marvin, and Valerie A. Ramey (2001), "The Cost Channel of Monetary Trans-
mission", NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2001.
[2] Bernanke, Ben S., and Alan S. Blinder (1992), "The Federal Funds Rate and the Chan-
nels of Monetary Transmission" The American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 4 (Sep.),
901-21.
[3] Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, Mark Watson, Christopher A. Sims, and Benjamin M.
Friedman (1997), "Systematic Monetary Policy and the E¤ects of Oil Price Shocks",
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Iss. 1, 91-157.
[4] Bernanke, Ben S., and Ilian Mihov (1998), "Measuring Monetary Policy", The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 3 (Aug.), 869-902.
[5] Bils, Mark and Peter J. Klenow (2004), "Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky
Prices", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. 5, 947-985.
[6] Boivin, Jean, and Marc P. Giannoni (2002), "Assessing Changes in the Monetary Trans-
mission Mechanism: A VAR Approach", Economic Policy Review, May, 97-107.
[7] Boivin, Jean, and Marc P. Giannoni (2006), "Has Monetary Policy Become More E¤ec-
tive?", The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Aug.), 445-62.
[8] Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans (1996), "Monetary policy
shocks: what have we learned and to what end?", In: Michael Woodford and John
Taylor, eds, Handbook of Macroeconomics North Holland.
[9] Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler (1999), "The Science of Monetary Policy:
A New Keynesian Perspective", In: Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37 (December
1999), 1661-07.
14
[10] Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler (2000), "Monetary Policy Rules and
Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory", Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 115, No. 1 (Feb.), 147-80.
[11] Cochrane, John H. (1998), "What do the VARs Mean? Measuring the Output E¤ects
of Monetary Policy", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 (Apr.), 277-300.
[12] Cochrane, John H. (2004), "Comments on A new measure of monetary shocks: Deriva-
tion and implications", presented at NBER EFG meeting (July).
[13] Favero, Carlo A. and Riccardo Rovelli (2003), "Macroeconomic Stability and the Prefer-
ences of the Fed: A Formal Analysis, 1961-98, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Vol. 35, No. 4, 545-556.
[14] Gali, Jordi (2008): "Monetary Policy, Ination, and the Business Cycle: An Introduc-
tion to the New Keynesian Framework", Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
[15] Gertler, Mark, and Cara S. Lown (2000), "The Information in the High-Yield Bond
Spread for the Business Cycle: Evidence and Some Implications", NBER working paper
no. 7549.
[16] Kahn, James A., Margaret M. McConnell, and Gabriel Perez-Quiros (2002), "On the
Causes of the Increased Stability of the U.S. Economy", Economic Policy Review, May,
183-201.
[17] Kishor, N. Kundan, and Levis A. Kochin (2006): "The Success of the Fed and the Death
of Monetarism", Economic Inquiry, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan.), 56-70.
[18] Kuttner, Kenneth N., and Patricia C. Mosser (2002): "The Monetary Transmission
Mechanism: Some Answers and Further Questions", FRBNY Policy Review, May, 15-
26.
15
[19] McConnell, Margaret M., and Gabriel Perez-Quiros (2000), "Output Fluctuations in the
United States: What has Changed Since the Early 1980s?", The American Economic
Review, Vol. 90, No. 5 (Dec.), 1464-76.
[20] Nakamura, Emi, and Jon Steinsson (2008), "Five Facts about Prices: A Reevaluation of
Menu Cost Models", The Quartlerly Journal of Economics, Iss. 4 (November), 1415-64.
[21] Orphanides, Athanasios (2001), "Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data",
American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Sep.), 964-85.
[22] Orphanides, Athanasios (2002): "Monetary Policy and the Great Ination", American
Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 2 (May), 115-20.
[23] Orphanides, Athanasios (2004), "Monetary Policy Rules, Macroeconomic Stability and
Ination", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr.), 151-75.
[24] Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer (2004), "A NewMeasure of Monetary Shocks:
Derivation and Implications", The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Sep.),
1055-84.
[25] Senda, Takashi (2005), "Determining Output and Ination Variability: Are the Phillips
Curve and the Monetary Policy Reaction Function Responsible", Economic Inquiry,
Vol. 43, No. 2, 431-453.
[26] Taylor, John B. (1999), " Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macroeconomics", in
J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics, chapter 15, 1341-97,
Elsevier, New York.
[27] Tchaidze, Robert (2004), "The Greenbook and U. S. Monetary Policy", IMF working
paper, WP/04/213.
16
Data Appendix
In order to make the results of the papers comparable we use the same data series as
Romer and Romer (2004).
Derivation of the monetary policy shocks
For 1969 to 1996, we use the data set by Romer and Romer (2004), which is available
at the http : ==elsa:berkeley:edu=~dromer=. For the time after 1996 we use the so called
Greensheets (available at the Federal Reserve of Philadelphias website) containing the
Federal Reserve sta¤s internal forecasts of ination (the implicit GDP deator/GDP chain
waited price index at an annual rate), output growth (percentage change in real GDP at an
annual rate) and the unemployment rate. As the FOMC began stating its federal funds rate
target explicitly in 1994, we use the announced federal funds rate target from the Federal
Reserve Banks website as the measure of the intended federal funds rate.
The monetary policy shocks are derived for every regular FOMC meeting with available
Greenbook forecasts (8 to 14 per year).
Measuring the impact of monetary policy shocks on output and ination
As in Romer and Romer (2004), the measure of output growth in the VARs is the log of
the non-seasonally-adjusted index of industrial production (series B50001, available on the
website of the Board of Governors). The measure of ination is the log of the non-seasonally-
adjusted producer price index (series WPUSO3000, available at the website of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics). The series contain monthly data.
The monetary policy shocks derived from (equation 1) are converted into monthly shocks
by setting shocks equal to zero for months without regular FOMC meeting, and by summing
shocks for months with more than one FOMC meeting. The shocks are cumulated for the
VAR estimation.
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Figure 1: Cumulated Monetary Policy Shocks Estimated Using a Single Reaction Function
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Figure 2: Cumulated Monetary Policy Shocks Estimated Using Di¤erent Reaction Functions
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses Based on Single Monetary Policy Reaction Function (1969-
2001)
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses Based on Separate Monetary Policy Reaction Functions (1969-
1979:Q2)
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses Based on Separate Monetary Policy Reaction Functions
(1979:Q3-2001)
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Table 1: Monetary Policy Shocks Using One Policy Reaction Function for1969-2001 (in
percentage points)
Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sep Oct. Nov. Dec.
1969 0.000 0.000 -0.224 0.448 0.217 -0.003 0.190 0.316 0.035 0.117 0.012 0.080
1970 -0.130 -0.338 -0.102 -0.113 0.306 -0.172 -0.232 -0.459 -0.257 -0.001 -0.352 -0.242
1971 -0.670 -0.032 -0.077 0.447 0.043 0.407 -0.106 0.000 0.000 -0.311 -0.352 -0.914
1972 -0.235 -0.070 0.262 -0.107 -0.117 -0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 -0.025
1973 0.278 0.224 0.065 -0.075 0.304 0.393 0.107 0.292 -0.585 -0.847 -0.096 -0.183
1974 -0.185 0.214 0.754 0.397 0.379 0.261 -0.113 -0.038 -0.437 -0.283 0.328 -0.234
1975 -0.334 0.251 -0.449 -0.621 0.114 0.171 0.053 -0.144 -0.148 -0.218 -0.289 0.257
1976 -0.104 -0.463 -0.251 0.144 -0.295 -0.042 -0.138 -0.046 0.005 -0.052 0.016 -0.123
1977 -0.099 -0.110 -0.243 -0.069 -0.069 -0.158 -0.253 0.019 0.060 -0.028 -0.056 -0.126
1978 -0.207 0.091 0.028 -0.066 -0.213 0.219 -0.144 -0.068 -0.168 0.121 0.151 -0.056
1979 0.000 -0.174 0.111 -0.068 0.093 0.000 0.747 0.338 -0.208 0.000 0.059 0.000
1980 -0.003 0.223 1.407 -3.243 -0.769 0.000 0.420 -0.166 0.781 1.209 1.865 -0.642
1981 0.000 -0.772 0.328 0.000 1.498 0.000 -0.643 -0.063 0.000 -0.585 -0.380 0.105
1982 0.000 1.005 -0.439 0.000 -0.093 0.000 -0.215 -0.239 0.000 -0.254 0.101 0.646
1983 0.000 0.197 0.135 0.000 -0.020 0.000 -0.001 -0.249 0.000 0.250 -0.172 0.202
1984 0.254 0.000 -0.095 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.319 -0.070 0.000 0.015 -0.553 -0.152
1985 0.000 -0.153 0.202 0.000 -0.110 0.000 0.064 0.189 0.000 0.103 0.019 -0.065
1986 0.000 -0.092 0.000 0.225 0.084 0.000 -0.173 -0.226 0.018 0.000 0.030 -0.073
1987 0.000 0.203 0.220 0.000 0.250 0.000 -0.029 -0.012 -0.131 0.000 -0.078 -0.154
1988 0.000 -0.198 0.055 0.000 0.212 0.321 0.000 -0.163 -0.049 0.000 -0.015 0.443
1989 0.000 0.289 0.059 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.084 -0.127 0.000 -0.080 0.120 -0.062
1990 0.000 0.322 -0.081 0.000 0.045 0.000 -0.069 0.163 0.000 -0.096 0.013 -0.117
1991 0.000 -0.241 0.249 0.000 0.254 0.000 -0.070 0.133 0.000 -0.023 -0.113 0.143
1992 0.000 0.028 -0.089 0.000 0.158 0.000 -0.071 0.014 0.000 -0.152 -0.001 -0.210
1993 0.000 0.113 -0.044 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.036 0.068 0.178 0.000 -0.071 -0.141
1994 0.000 0.241 0.329 0.000 0.316 0.000 0.078 0.431 0.058 0.000 0.581 -0.232
1995 0.000 0.523 0.262 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.021 -0.072 0.044 0.000 0.077 -0.149
1996 0.085 0.000 0.085 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.016 -0.034 -0.016 0.000 0.069 0.001
1997 0.000 0.013 0.102 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.029 0.198 -0.183 0.000 -0.088 -0.011
1998 0.000 -0.025 -0.033 0.000 -0.103 0.000 0.034 0.101 -0.251 0.000 -0.154 -0.172
1999 0.000 -0.146 -0.192 0.000 -0.058 0.213 0.000 0.258 0.000 -0.136 0.220 -0.195
2000 0.000 0.0412 0.006 0.000 0.200 0.076 0.000 -0.043 0.000 -0.023 0.016 0.228
2001 0.095 0.000 -0.482 0.098 0.000 -0.117 0.000 -0.119 0.000 -0.154 -0.188 -0.272
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Table 2: Monetary Policy Shocks Using Two Separate Policy Reaction Functions for 1969-
1979:2 and 1979:3-2001 (in percentage points)
Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sep Oct. Nov. Dec.
1969 0.000 0.000 -0.212 0.551 0.282 0.118 0.202 0.319 0.080 0.320 0.126 0.125
1970 -0.175 -0.300 -0.020 -0.054 0.034 -0.051 -0.152 -0.422 -0.215 0.156 -0.272 -0.155
1971 -0.528 0.054 0.121 0.386 0.158 0.648 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.073 -0.338 -0.702
1972 -0.369 -0.143 0.125 -0.100 -0.121 -0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.010
1973 0.249 0.100 -0.036 -0.068 0.276 0.287 0.197 0.184 -0.453 -0.779 -0.027 -0.371
1974 -0.251 0.157 0.728 0.426 0.194 0.196 -0.111 -0.090 -0.466 -0.344 0.090 -0.246
1975 -0.185 0.096 -0.173 -0.193 0.214 0.406 0.351 -0.055 0.081 0.010 -0.233 0.115
1976 0.054 -0.135 -0.081 0.328 -0.107 0.032 0.073 0.119 0.107 0.029 0.027 0.090
1977 0.044 -0.065 -0.072 -0.110 -0.086 -0.218 -0.167 0.148 0.134 0.032 0.006 -0.062
1978 -0.091 0.083 -0.049 -0.044 -0.099 0.149 -0.083 -0.093 -0.131 0.234 0.246 0.085
1979 0.000 -0.141 0.056 -0.115 0.042 0.000 0.399 -0.152 -0.587 0.000 0.081 0.000
1980 0.098 0.249 1.749 -2.582 -0.513 0.000 0.111 -0.510 0.255 0.652 1.484 -0.396
1981 0.000 -0.888 0.110 0.000 1.502 0.000 -0.525 0.043 0.000 -0.462 -0.029 0.310
1982 0.000 0.965 -0.382 0.000 -0.041 0.000 0.071 -0.251 0.000 -0.161 0.183 0.706
1983 0.000 0.190 0.180 0.000 -0.049 0.000 -0.074 -0.256 0.000 0.029 -0.438 -0.142
1984 -0.104 0.000 -0.361 0.000 -0.140 0.000 0.176 -0.070 0.000 0.085 -0.645 -0.279
1985 0.000 -0.309 0.164 0.000 -0.119 0.000 0.123 0.257 0.000 0.149 0.171 0.014
1986 0.000 -0.070 0.000 0.161 -0.078 0.000 -0.246 -0.221 0.058 0.000 0.099 -0.089
1987 0.000 0.309 0.262 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.005 -0.007 -0.173 0.000 -0.179 -0.066
1988 0.000 -0.161 0.013 0.000 0.047 0.262 0.000 -0.371 -0.152 0.000 -0.303 0.055
1989 0.000 0.162 -0.050 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.115 -0.070 0.000 -0.061 0.097 0.014
1990 0.000 0.361 -0.084 0.000 -0.032 0.000 -0.169 0.309 0.000 0.239 0.071 -0.004
1991 0.000 -0.435 0.155 0.000 -0.046 0.000 -0.448 -0.105 0.000 -0.301 -0.245 0.195
1992 0.000 -0.118 -0.142 0.000 -0.029 0.000 -0.241 -0.161 0.000 -0.221 -0.084 -0.312
1993 0.000 -0.089 -0.179 0.000 0.167 0.000 -0.048 -0.138 -0.069 0.000 -0.221 -0.336
1994 0.000 0.040 0.181 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.020 0.412 0.037 0.000 0.545 -0.302
1995 0.000 0.554 0.355 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.145 -0.078 0.161 0.000 -0.019 -0.069
1996 0.260 0.000 0.038 0.000 -0.017 0.000 -0.034 0.067 -0.001 0.000 0.036 -0.027
1997 0.000 0.035 0.046 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.120 0.383 -0.118 0.000 -0.125 -0.010
1998 0.000 0.165 0.176 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.217 0.248 -0.020 0.000 0.085 -0.006
1999 0.000 0.023 -0.096 0.000 -0.073 0.211 0.000 0.247 0.000 -0.058 0.199 -0.266
2000 0.000 -0.162 -0.199 0.000 -0.025 -0.138 0.000 -0.158 0.000 -0.149 -0.143 0.141
2001 0.193 0.000 -0.327 0.120 0.000 -0.101 0.000 -0.126 0.000 -0.078 -0.014 -0.113
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